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Ethical Judgements: Re-Writing Medical Law is an engaging and timely addition to 
the socio-legal literature on the interaction between medical law, ethics, and the 
judiciary. It addresses and makes explicit, in a rather original manner,1 the 
complex ethical questions that “hard” medical law cases pose for the judiciary. 
From cases concerning the beginning of life, the end of life, and professional 
obligations, judges have long grappled with the complex interaction between 
legal and moral dilemmas in medicine. This volume presents a collection of nine 
key medical law cases in the UK, each case “re-written” from the perspectives of 
a group over 30 academics from varying backgrounds.  
Each case is approached via a two-stage process. First, the decisions are 
“re-written” in the form of two judgements (both based on the established facts 
of the case, and the law at the time) and then engaged with by two authors: one 
from a legal perspective, and another from an ethical perspective. Each case 
section thus consists of four parts: two judgements and two commentaries. All of 
these analyses are based upon a simple premise: what if, in addition to decision-
making from a legal perspective, judges were required to acknowledge and 
reason their ethical positions, and how might that impact upon the final decision? 
Thus, in the editors’ own words:  
 
This collection, then, involves an ethical re-writing of health care 
law. What has resulted is somewhat akin to a work in counter-
factual history; a sort of ‘alternate world’ opened up by asking 
‘what if…?’ (p. 4) 
                                                 
1  The text acknowledges the Feminist Judgments Project (a research project in which feminist 
socio-legal scholars wrote alternative judgments to significant cases from a feminist 
perspective) but also notes that they did not entirely follow its lead. See Rosemary Hunter, 
Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley (eds.), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2010). 
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The book’s introduction also calls for the examination of three overarching 
questions. First, in making medico-legal decisions in court, have judges drawn 
conclusions based on the requirements of law, or have they instead drawn upon 
extra-legal factors, meaning that there were other possible outcomes to the case? 
Second, should judges  embrace extra-legal factors in their decision-making 
where the “right” legal answer is unacceptable or unclear? Third, should further 
engagement between medical law and ethics occur, or should they be formally 
detached? The answers to each these are drawn out in the varying perspectives 
of the lawyers, ethicists and social scientists who author their contributions to the 
re-writing of, and commentary on, these landmark cases. 
The book opens with the case of Re A (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) 
[2001] Fam 147, where the court had to consider whether it was lawful to separate 
conjoined twins even though it was certain that the procedure would result in 
one of them dying. Suzanne Ost (Lancaster University) and Richard Huxtable 
(University of Bristol), as the judicial “re-writers”, sat as the Court of Appeal. 
Dismissing and upholding the appeal respectively, each author advances their 
judicial analysis through quite different legal lenses. While both agree that actus 
reus for murder was present if the procedure were to take place, they differ in 
judgement on the matter of whether mens rea was present. These decisions are 
followed by a legal commentary from Kirsty Moreton (Keele University), who 
notes, among other things, that both judgements combine innovative and 
traditional interpretations of the law. Moreton’s analysis is followed by a 
commentary from Jackie Leach Scully (Newcastle University), who provides 
ethical reflection on some of the key concepts on these judgements.  
The second section looks at R (on the application of Axon) v Secretary of State 
for Health [2006] EHWC 37 (Admin), where the court considered the 
circumstances in which a patient under 16 years of age could consent to an 
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abortion without their parents’ knowledge or consent. Here, Jonathan Herring 
(Oxford University) and Hazel Biggs (University of Southampton) strongly 
support the ethical principle of autonomy in their judgements. Elizabeth Wicks 
(Leicester University), in providing legal analysis, comments that while defence 
of autonomy is to be praised, there is much work still to be done to resolve 
inconsistencies within the law on this principle. The ethical commentary by 
David Archard (Queen’s University Belfast) explores the relation between 
autonomy and confidentiality between doctor and minor.  
The third judgement addressed by scholars is Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 
[1993] AC 789. Here the court was asked to consider whether artificial nutrition 
and hydration (ANH) could lawfully be withdrawn from a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state. Writing as Law Lords, Stephen Smith (Cardiff University) and 
David Jones (Anscombe Bioethics Centre) deliver very different judgements on 
this issue, highlighting the tension between quality of life and sanctity of life 
arguments. Hazel Biggs discusses these judgements and the withdrawal of ANH 
from a legal perspective, followed by James Childress (University of Virginia), 
who reasons that the withdrawal of ANH can be ethically acceptable in certain 
circumstances.  
The fourth case re-writes R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
ex parte Blood [1999] Fam 151, which concerned the question of whether a woman 
could posthumously use her husband’s sperm to conceive a child. Graeme Laurie 
(University of Edinburgh) and Emily Jackson (LSE) both posit written consent 
(and its absence in this case) as decisive in considering whether the posthumous 
removal of sperm is lawful. These judgements are followed by a legal 
commentary from Mary Neal (University of Strathclyde), who explores some of 
the wider themes of the case, such as human dignity, and their implications. 
Heather Widdows (University of Birmingham) then analyses the case from an 
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ethical perspective, emphasising the duty of ethicists to question the justification 
and wider implications of legal principles, such as those in Blood.  
The fifth case addresses Bolitho v Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, 
which concerned the question of how courts should treat medical expertise when 
considering medical negligence, and the extent to which they should be involved 
in clinical decision-making. Writing as Law Lords, José Miola (Leicester 
University) and Jonathan Montgomery (UCL) agree on many aspects of the case, 
for example that a level of judicial restraint is appropriate in cases concerning 
treatment and diagnosis, but they differ in their structural perspective on law 
with regard to the place of ethics within it. The legal commentary for this section, 
provided by Nicky Priaulx, Martin Weinel and Chris Goldsworthy (all Cardiff 
University), supports Miola’s judgement, noting that context is a critical element 
when making  determinations in this field. In the final section on this case, John 
Harrington (Cardiff University) posits that Montgomery and Miola’s judgements 
must be contextualised alongside the decline in plausibility of the Bolam2 test, and 
links this to a “crisis of legal form” associated with the welfare state. 
The sixth case addresses R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687, a landmark case 
concerning whether a doctor had lawfully performed an abortion on a 14-year 
old girl. Sheelagh McGuinness (University of Bristol) writes her judgement 
through the lens of women’s rights and justice; in contrast, Joseph Dellapenna 
(Villanova University) provides a judgement which focuses upon the rights of 
the “unborn child”. Lois Bibbings’ (University of Bristol) legal commentary 
provides background and summaries of the case as it was originally decided, and 
“re-written”, while Françoise Baylis’s (Dalhousie University) ethical commentary 
explores whether Bourne may be said to have acted for the right reasons.  
                                                 
2  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
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The seventh case, Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, looked at  how the law 
should respond to a surgeon’s failure to properly explain the inherent risks of an 
operation to their patient. Here, Rob Heywood (UEA) and Sarah Devaney 
(University of Manchester) advance judgements which recognise the interplay 
between legal rules and ethical principles. Acknowledging that attempting to 
marry these principles resulted in the “bending” of law to suit the Claimant, José 
Miola then provides an alternative reading of the law in his commentary. This is 
followed by John Coggon (University of Bristol), who reflects on the concept of 
autonomy and its protection in medical law.  
The eighth case addressed by scholars, R (on the Application of Nicklinson 
and Another) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, considered a legal challenge to 
the law prohibiting assisted suicide. Writing as Supreme Court Justices, John 
Coggon and Richard Huxtable offer different theoretical viewpoints on the 
relationship between particular theories of philosophy, ethics and law in this 
context. Clark Hobson (University of Birmingham) then explores their 
approaches from a legal perspective, followed by Stephen W Smith’s ethical 
commentary, which highlights some of the key ethical differences between the 
two judgements.  
The ninth and final case discussed is St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S 
[1999] Fam 26. Here, the court was asked to consider whether a woman had a 
right to refuse a caesarean section, even if that meant she and her foetus might 
die. Sarah Fovargue (Lancaster University) and Mary Neal, sitting as the Court 
of Appeal, advance rather different perspectives on the extent to which the law 
should value and protect foetal life. Sheelagh McGuinness then reflects on the 
original judgement of the case, framing her analysis with the concept of 
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“gendered harms”3 in pregnancy and reproduction. Sorcha Uí Chonnachtaigh 
(Keele University) provides a feminist ethical critique of the re-written 
judgements.  
 Having revealed a range of possible structural perspectives on the law, 
the book concludes by considering some of the lessons learned from these 
exercises in judicial reasoning. The authors make clear that not only do these 
alternative judgements highlight how the law might have been different, but also 
how ethical concerns might have impacted on judicial reasoning in these cases. 
Noting that this project was not without constraints, it goes on to consider some 
of these, including the influence of academia upon the minds of judges. The 
authors conclude, however, by addressing one of the biggest challenges these 
kinds of cases pose to medical law, as highlighted by this volume: what is the 
value of ethical, rather than legal consistency, in cases where there is no obvious 
right or wrong outcome? Their answer is that the book demonstrates that a “court 
of morals” would not necessarily achieve decisions or outcomes any more 
palatable than those that have been arrived at by our courts of law.  
Overall, Ethical Judgements: Re-Writing Medical Law is a fascinating volume 
that delivers, as the authors conclude: 
 
…new insights and perspectives not only into what different 
arguments tell us the law does and should say, but also into how 
we – non judges – might approach controversial medico-legal 
questions when challenged to do so as (admittedly imagined) 
judges. (p. 256) 
 
                                                 
3  McGuinness borrows this concept from Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York: NYUP, 
1997).  
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The alternative judgements given in the book, often from quite different 
perspectives, coupled with the legal and ethical commentaries, provide a 
compelling demonstration of the “alternative histories” that might have been 
created within the field of medical law. Not only must we be alive to the legacy 
these decisions provide and their real-world repercussions, but also to how they 
might have been different, and thus continue to question the place of ethics in the 
courts. It is therefore important to be aware of, and challenge, alternative 
possibilities in this field by asking: “what if?”. 
